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Abstract. We give an explicit definition of decentralization and show you that 
decentralization is almost impossible for the current stage and Bitcoin is the 
first truly noncentralized currency in the currency history. We propose a new 
framework of noncentralized cryptocurrency system with an assumption of the 
existence of a weak adversary for a bank alliance. It abandons the mining 
process and blockchain, and removes history transactions from data synchroni-
zation. We propose a consensus algorithm named ―Converged Consensus‖ for a 
noncentralized cryptocurrency system. 
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Introduction 
Bitcoin is a peer to peer distributed digital currency system whose implementation is 
mainly based on cryptography. As a decentralized cryptocurrency, it has attracted lots 
of attention and has been widely adopted over the whole world. It is proposed by 
Satoshi Nakamoto in 2008 and created in 2009. Its goal is to build a practical decen-
tralized cryptocurrency system. To achieve this goal, it adopts a proof of work me-
chanism to distribute the coins and validate the transactions. This mechanism is im-
plemented by a sophisticated design of block and blockchain. The system adopts a 
longest blockchain principle to represent the consensus of users about the general 
ledger.  
In the Bitcoin system every transaction is stored in the blockchain. Over time, the 
size of the blockchain grows very fast. Ordinary users hate to verify transactions and 
synchronize the whole blockchain and the trading between Bitcoin and some fiat cur-
rency is invietable, so that they have to rely on some exchange hub which leads to 
additional safety dependence which severely compromises the safety of Bitcoins. The 
Mt.Gox event broke out against such a background. Many innocent users lost their 
Bitcoins. In addition, the intensive mining process results in a colossal waste of elec-
tricity and computing resources. 
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The proof of work mechanism makes the Bitcoin system expose itself to any po-
tential superiority computing power attacker who may even hold no Bitcoin. There is 
a bad news about the Bitcoin system in Jun 2014, a major mining pool ghash.io had 
ever controlled more than 50% of computing power. This is a dangerous sign and is 
unacceptable for an alleged decentralized cryptocurrency system. Various of pheno-
menon express that the feasibility of a decentralized cryptocurrency is questionable. 
The main content of this paper is divided to two parts. We first try to show you that 
decentralization is almost impossible for the current stage in Part I and we propose a 
new framework of noncentralized cryptocurrency system for a bank alliance in Part II. 
Noncentralization 
Definition Centralization:  A cryptocurrency system which is totally controlled 
by one single entity. 
Definition Decentralization: A cryptocurrency system which has only one safety 
dependency that is the private key. 
Definition Noncentralization: A cryptocurrency system which is neither centra-
lized nor decentralized. 
 
Simply speaking, Decentralization means no trust; Noncentralization means partial 
trust and Centralization means fully trust. 
 
Mining Centralization 
 
The longest chain principle of Bitcoin provides a winner-take-all competition me-
chanism. For any miner, the best strategy is to try its best to get stronger or to merge 
with other miners to get itself stronger. As long as there are more than one miner (a 
mining pool is deemed as a miner) such fierce competition won’t cease. Thus the 
mining system has strong incentive to get centralized. The equilibrium result is that 
there is only one miner left. 
Although there are still more than one major mining pools at present, the weak 
pools are going to disappear because they are not able to get enough rewards to cover 
the cost for running a mining pool. The number of mining pools is going down. Even 
though the number won’t reduce to one, how could we know the major mining pools 
are not controlled by some single underground big boss? This is called Sybil attack 
which means mining pools with different names are merely sybils of some under-
ground big boss.  
According to previous definition of Decentralization and Noncentralization, Bitcoin 
is obviously not decentralized as some fans claimed but running as a noncentralized 
system. 
As can be seen, essentially, Satoshi’s competitive blockchain solution to decentra-
lization is centralization which is a trivial solution. As a decentralized cryptocurrency, 
the Bitcoin system is clearly failed, however, a failed experiment can provide us much 
valuable information.  
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First Noncentralized Currency  
Although mining centralization is inevitable, Bitcoin is still a truly noncentralized 
cryptocurrency system. In fact, the mining center will control most part of the Bitcoin 
system but not the whole system. In a typical centralized currency system, the central 
bank has super power of transferring money from any account to any other account, 
while the mining center doesn’t has such super power and it’s possible for stakehold-
ers to fork the Bitcoin system whenever they find the mining center is no longer 
trustworthy. So Bitcoin is not totally controlled by the mining center. According to 
our previous definition, Bitcoin system is a noncentralized cryptocurrency and it is the 
first truly noncentralized currency in the currency history. 
Virtual General Adversary (VGA) 
For any decentralized system we assume there is one single Virtual General Adver-
sary which is trying to attack the system. "Virtual General" means it includes any 
factor (including communication problem and some abstract attack behaviors) which 
may lead to the failure of decentralization. Virtually, the adversary can do whatever it 
can do to attack the system. We consider 4 major attack behaviors. 
○1 maliciously construct messages,  
○2 maliciously schedule messages,  
○3 sybil attack 
○4 centralization 
    The Bitcoin system manages to build up strong resistance to ○1 , because construct-
ing a block with high difficulty value is very expensive, nevertheless, it has very weak 
resistance to ○2 (e.g. a mining pool may withhold blocks it discovered) ○3 (we don’t 
know whether there is a underground boss)○4 (there is strong incentive to get centra-
lized). These mean that the blockchain mechanism merely partially meets the chal-
lenge ○1 . 
 
    To overcome any one of these 4 attack behaviors is a big challenge, let alone to 
overcome all of them simultaneously to build a truly decentralized cryptocurrency. 
Decentralization is too good to be true for the current stage. Probably, it belongs to 
the far future say the 22
nd
 century, by when some truly revolutionary breakthrough of 
communication technique or computational theory may have occurred. 
    To take the second best, we try to propose a new framework of noncentralized 
cryptocurrency system with an assumption of the existence of a weak adversary, 
which may be practical for the current stage. 
    When we talk about an adversary we consider an adversary quadruple Q:= 
<R,S,I,C> where R is the basic Resources (e.g. computing power, money) the adver-
sary possesses, S is the ability the adversary Scheduling messages, I is the ability the 
adversary gathering Information of the system, C is the attraction degree of the sys-
tem getting Centralized. 
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    It’s hard to accurately quantify the value of Q and if we simply assume a super high 
value of Q then we always get negative result. Hence, we assume a weak virtual gen-
eral adversary with a low Q value for our new system. How weak exactly? Honestly, 
we have no idea. Just like the Bitcoin system we need to do experiments to gather 
information and finetune the parameters.  
We suppose the system is found by a bank alliance which includes N member 
banks all over the whole world. The banks are highly trusted, not completely trusted 
though. That accords with the assumption of a weak adversary. We name the new 
system X-Coin. Every expected event in the system has a timeout value, some of 
which are set globally the others are set locally. 
Balanceview  
Since we don't need mining anymore, we replace the concept of block and blockchain 
with normal data list. 
Definition Balanceview is a data list compounding a balance record list and a bank 
list. 
Definition Baseview is a Balanceview based on which some important actions are 
taken. 
 
balance record 
[ 
 pubkey,  
 balance 
] 
 
balanceview 
[ 
      bank list 
height,  //sequence number of a Balanceview increasing continuously from 0 
baseview hash, // refers to the Baseview of this Balanceview  
package hash,      // refers to the package which is actually calculated 
[record1, record2, record3],  
] 
 
transaction 
[ 
height,       
baseview hash, 
unique code, 
sender pubkey, 
receiver pubkey, 
volume, 
transaction fee,  
sender signature 
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] 
transaction list 
[ 
 [tx1, tx2, tx3... ], 
bank signature 
] 
 
An end user sets a max transaction fee he will pay, for every new transaction and 
sends it to a selected bank. The bank will pick up the transaction if it provides enough 
transaction fee. Every bank verifies and collects transactions and makes a transaction 
list and broadcasts the list to other banks. 
 
Definition agent An agent is a bank which chooses to collect transaction lists from 
banks and make a transaction package and broadcasts the package to be verified and 
granted by banks. 
 
A bank grants a package which shares the same Baseview by signing the package and 
sends a granter item back to the agent. Every bank freely sets a granting rule to select 
out packages which it wants to grant. 
 
Definition Package-51 An agent collects granter items from other banks. Once it 
collects over 51% of grants, it combines the transactions package and a granter items 
list to form a pakcage-51 and broadcasts this package-51 to announce a new candidate 
Balanceview. A new Balanceview can be calculated according to a package-51 and 
the last Baseview. The total transaction fees are divided by the ratio: p for the agent, q 
for the deputy bank, r equally divided to all banks. 
 
granter item 
[ 
granter's pubkey, 
granter's signature   // signs a package 
] 
 
granter item list 
[ 
[item1, item2, item3... ], 
] 
 
transaction package 
[ 
height,  
baseview hash,  
pubkey of source node, 
transaction list, 
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signature, 
] 
package-51 
[ 
package, 
granter item list,    
signature of agent 
] 
 
Consensus 
It's possible that more than one package based on one Baseview get 51% of grants, 
consequently, more than one package-51 is broadcasted. Then the consensus of the 
new Balanceview can be split. This circumstance is analogous to a blockchain forks. 
According to the longest chain principle, the Bitcoin system guarentee the termina-
tion of a consensus process, which means whenever you see a longer valid blockchain 
you decide on that blockchain. But the consistency is not 100% gaurenteed. Because 
multiple valid blocks at one height is possible and the virtual general adversary may 
mailously schedule the spreading of blocks. To prevent such uncertainty, a checkpoint 
mechanism and a confirmation delay of 6 blocks is introduced. Only decentralization 
guarantees both termination and consistency. Bitcoin is obviously not decentralized. 
Taking the consensus standard of Bitcoin as a reference, X-Coin guarantees the 
termination and consistency with high probability. Our main idea of consensus algo-
rithm is roughly as simple as following. 
Suppose there are 100 red balls and 100 black balls in a bag, one randomly selects 
5 balls, if red balls is more than black balls then one balck ball will turn to red ball, 
vise versa. He does this time and time again, eventually colors of all 200 balls will 
converge to one single color, ether all black or all red. 
Suppose there are 100 balls in a bag, if one consecutively 20 times randomly se-
lects 1 ball are all red balls. Then the probability of most of 100 balls are red balls is 
extremly high. 
In practice, we present a Balanceview Indirectly denoted by ibv to save the space. 
When necessary, we reconstruct the Balanceview according to an ibv. 
indirect presented Balanceview 
[ 
height, 
hash of package-51,      // refers to a package-51 which is actually calculated 
] 
When a bank receives the first valid package-51 at its current height, it makes an ibv 
of this new Balanceview as its current ibv. 
Converged Consensus Algorithm: 
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while no consecutive identical k ibv_update observed 
      randomly sample n ibv // timeout gives a NULL ibv 
      ibv_update = the most frequent ibv  
      if ibv_update.height < current height  
          discard   //we should never go backward 
decide on ibv_update 
if ibv_update == NULL or Baseview collision detected then alert 
 
Termination: Every honest node eventually decides, with probability 1. 
Since the adversary has limited ability of scheduling the messages, termination will be 
reached, sooner or later. 
    A bank reconstructs Baseview according to ibv_update. A bank’s current Balance-
view is volatile as the bank keeps updating. A Baseview is rather stable but still not 
permanent because the algorithm doesn’t guarantee completely consistent. 
Note that the distribution of ibv gets more and more consistent as the sampling and 
updating go and the speed of the converging process gets faster and faster due to the 
positive feedback effect which is a good merit for practical application. 
To avoid double spending, referring to Bitcoin’s strategy, we may delay the con-
firmation of transactions by several Baseviews. 
A Baseview collision means some bank decides on different ibv at one height. If a 
bank detects a Baseview collision (theoretically possible, but very rare) at one height 
or it decides on a NULL ibv then a human intervention is needed. 
Meta data & meta-transaction 
We can adjust the major parameters of X-Coin system by a meta-transaction which 
requires 75% of grants to take effect. 
We can adjust the ratio <p=0%, q=70%, r=30%> for dividing transaction fees 
which controls the intensity of competition among banks. We shouldn’t give strong 
incentive to banks choosing to be an agent to increase the initial consistency as much 
as possible. So we set p=0% or a very small positive number. The ratio q controls the 
competition intensity among the banks serving end users. The ratio r provides the 
basic support to all banks to make the public contribution such as verification, grant-
ing and keeping sampling. 
According to the Moore’s Law, the cost of making public contribution will be tri-
vial for a commercial bank and the banks are no longer a completely selfish entity 
hidden in the dark corner of the internet which can only be handled by Decentraliza-
tion. We are now Noncentralization. The banks are legal public companies. They care 
about their public reputation and image. X-Coin system has weak resistance to a small 
number of dishonest banks. 
We can adjust the sampling and termination parameters according to conditions of 
the environment. We can even inflate the money supply by a meta-transaction. If 
necessary, we can switch the system to a leader election mode, in which, we specifies 
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a fixed bank as the agent to increase the consistency and efficiency or to fix some 
emergent problems. 
We can make a statistic tool as a monitor model for a standard client for banks to 
monitor each other' behavior and a bank’s extremely abnormal behaviors will be re-
ported. We can use meta-transaction to remove a highly suspicious bank from the 
bank list as long as 75% of banks are convinced. Banks have sufficient incentive and 
social pressure to behaving normally and have little incentive to behave badly. 
Conclusion 
We agree that maintaining a trustable financial system is very expensive. Satoshi’s 
original idea is to trade expensive electricity and computing resources for Dencentra-
lization. If the strategy does work then it worth the cost. Unfortunately, we have 
shown you that Bitcoin is actually running as a Noncentralized system and has ob-
vious trend to evolve to a centralized system. So it’s unnecessary to waste that much 
electricity and computing resources to do meaningless hashing.  
As a decentralized system Bitcoin is obviously failed. For Decentralization the 
blockchain mechanism doesn’t work and for Noncentralization the blockchain me-
chanism is unnecessary. The blockchain mechanism has been proven by the reality to 
be a trivial and wasteful design. We assert the blockchain mechanism will be a flash 
in the pan. The most valuable information we get from the failed Bitcoin experiment 
is that Bitcoin has shown us that a noncentralized cryptocurrency system is possible.  
We have shown you that Decentralization is almost impossible in the current stage. 
Researchers should not claim a Decentralization and we should not believe in a 
claimed one. It’s all Noncentralization. We have one question for those who claim a 
Decentralization. Whether the system has only one safety dependency? If the answer 
is no, what are other unknown unclear undefined safety dependencies? How could 
they ensure the safety without even knowing all safety dependencies? Actually, they 
couldn't give an accurate quantitified definition of the adversary. They don't know 
what their adversary exactly is and how strong their adversary exactly is. So, their 
calculations on the safety analysis are very questionable. Decentralization is simply 
too good to be true. It's not the time for Decentralization. We suggest give the noncen-
tralized X-Coin system based on Converged Consensus a try. 
Although it is extremely hard to build a truly decentralized cryptocurrency system, 
we human beings do have gotten one truly decentralized currency system. It is the 
gold system which has only one safety dependency that is YOU. Your gold is safe as 
long as you keep your gold well so the only safety dependency is YOU—the owner of 
gold. We think of the gold system as a NATUAL Decentralized currency system. The 
gold system itself is a special Balanceview which represents the NATUAL consensus 
of the distribution of fortune of all mankind. 
Finally, we have a conjecture that the timeline of currency of mankind should be 
like this: 
Natural Decentralization (gold)   
Artificial Centralization (fiat currency)   
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Artificial Noncentralization (Bitcoin, X-Coin)   
Artificial Decentralization (X-Gold, our ultimate goal) 
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Appendix 
 
Solution to the ball problem: 
The changing of the state of all balls forms a Markov chain. Obviously, it’s an absorb-
ing Markov chain. Suppose its transition matrix P have t transient states (two colors) 
and r absorbing states (single color). Then: 
P =  
Q R
0 Ir
  
where Q is a t-by-t matrix, R is a nonzero t-by-r matrix, 0 is an r-by-t zero matrix, and 
Ir is the r-by-r identity matrix. Thus, Q describes the probability of transitioning from 
some transient state to another while R describes the probability of transitioning from 
some transient state to some absorbing state. 
n steps transition matrix: 
Pn =  
Q R
0 Ir
 
n
=   
Qn R′
0 Ir
  
The probability that the process will be absorbed is 1. Because limn→∞ Q
n = 0 
 
 
 
 
